Industry Comments
These are non-APA style articles highlighting gaming issues and insights, legal
developments, economic aspects, and other topics of concern to gaming researchers,
executives, managers and policy makers. An alternative form of peer-review more
appropriate to these articles assures critical assessment of this section.

In this issue:
1.
2.

The Gaming Control Act Fifty Years Later: a Call for Proactive Gaming Policy,
by Matthew J. Stafford, Boyd School of Law, UNLV.
Gentlemen's Clubs and Casinos in Las Vegas, by Amy L. Baker, Boyd School of
Law, UNLV.

Introduction
The UNLV Boyd School of Law has been a pioneer in the teaching of gaming law.
We have arranged to reprint two commendable gaming papers from the law school's
student writing competition.
Recognizing Nevada as the leader in gaming control, author Stafford reviews
Nevada's significant role in gaming regulation and projects a future receptive to new
policies and new models of operation. Author Baker faces the question of how far to go
in permitting or promoting adult-themed entertainment within a casino, which raises the
question: Are gentlemen's clubs with their overt sex appeal appropriate for a gaming
establishment?

The Gaming Control Act Fifty
Years Later:A Call for Proactive
Gaming Policy
Matthew J. Stafford
I. Introduction
As the current financial crisis grips the nation, Nevada gaming revenue continues
to decrease. 1 Besides seeking an economic turnaround, elected officials and the public
are demanding tougher regulation and increased oversight of financial institutions. 2 This
increase in federal regulation is sure to impact Nevada gaming licensees. This article sets
out to argue that Nevada gaming regulators should move from a reactive to a proactive
approach to regulation. A thorough review of the current regulations to reaffirm, amend,
or repeal them before reacting to market whims or federal regulation will enable Nevada
to regulate tomorrow's gaming industry.
Nevada's current approach to regulation sends a mixed message. On one hand,
regulators, licensees, and gaming attorneys use the refrain that gaming is a legitimate
business and work tirelessly to discredit stereotypes and misconceptions. 3 Unfortunately,
the regulatory structure sends the opposite message, without intrusive regulatory practices
the industry will devolve into a haven for criminal elements, short change the state of
tax revenue, or cheat its consumers. Are these assumptions undergirding the regulatory
structure stjl! true?
I
2
3

Howard Stutz, Casino Revenue Falls, Las Vegas Review Journal, April 08, 2009, at JD; Howard Stutz, Annual Gaming
Revenue Suffers Sharpest Drop in State History, February 12, 2009.
Jackie Calms, Both Sides of the Aisle See More Regulation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2008, at A15.
Robert Faiss, Against the Odds: Reflections on a Career in Gaming Control and Gaming Law, 12 Gaming L. Rev. 25, 29
(2008).
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Because of Nevada's efforts, gaming is a legitimate business on Wall Street and
other global financial centers. Licensees are rapidly coming under the purview of
multiple external regulators who create cumulative and repetitive regulation. Similarly,
the licensees of ten or fifteen years ago let alone fifty are not the same as today. Thus,
many licensees are subject to market forces and investors, essentially creating private
regulation that discourages actions covered by Nevada's regulatory scheme. This external
and private oversight may provide avenues to decrease the State's role in certain areas
or serve to validate current practice for alternative reasons. Nevertheless a rigorous
examination by regulators, industry representatives, elected officials, interest groups, and
the general public of the current regulatory scheme and current global gaming realities
is appropriate before making policy and structural changes to the system. 4 Allowing
many interests a seat at the table, in a public forum, creates a dynamic process and
allows buy-in and credibility to any recommendations submitted to the Nevada Gaming
Commission. 5
By exhaustively vetting the policy considerations behind Nevada's current regulatory
framework and beginning to approach regulation proactively, Nevada will remain the
hallmark of gaming jurisdictions by replacing out-dated or ill-suited considerations with
new policies or elimination of regulations.
The first part of the article will look at the evolution of gaming regulation and its
relationship to policy considerations. Secondly, it will examine external regulators and
disincentives created by market forces that similarly regulate licensees or make certain
standards duplicative or burdensome. Finally, it will submit a model for examination of
the regulations and two areas for examination.

II. Gaming Regulation and Policy
The "Nevada model" of regulation seeks to maximize the economic benefits
of gaming and allows the industry to meet market demands with little regulatory
involvement. Although business decisions are vested with the industry, integrity and
suitability issues are strictly regulated. 6 This is accomplished through the twin pillars
of Nevada regulation, licensing and oversight. Licensing and oversight of gaming has
always been present, however its form and the policy reasons guiding it evolved in a
reactionary fashion.
Licensure- tax collection, suitability, and exceptionalism.
From 1931 to 1945 a casino operator merely paid the minimal licensing fees for slot
machines and table games. 7 The fees were collected by the appropriate town, city or
county and the fees were apportioned at twenty-five percent to the state and twenty-five
percent to the city or town, if the activity took place there, the remainder was retained
by the county. 8 Poor enforcement of the fee schedule yielded low tax revenues but the
Legislature's only action was a resolution reprimanding local law enforcement. 9
Concerned about a budget deficit State legislators passed Senate Bill No. 142. 10 The
bill taxed a casino's gross revenue and placed regulatory responsibility with the Nevada
Tax Commission. 11 Because the policy emphasized the generation and collection of
tax revenue, the state left enforcement responsibilities with the local authorities. 12 This
scheme generated revenue but left the Tax Commission powerless to exclude unfit
4
5

"I learned to listen and make sure I understood the problem before I offered a resolution to it."' Faiss, supra note 3, at 30.
The notion that conflict is beneficial to good government has been espoused since Machiavelli. See Niccolo Machiavelli,
Discourses on Livy (Harvey C. Mansfield & Nathan Tarcov trans., University of Chicago Press 1998) (ca. 1513-17).
6 See Nat'! Gambling Impact Study Comm'n, Final Report, at 3-1 (1999) available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/
index.htrnl; Cory Aronovitz, The Regulation of Commercial Gaming, 5 Chap. L. Rev. 181, 190 (2002).
7 Lionel, Sawyer, & Collins, Nevada Gaming Law, 10-11 (3"'. ed. 2000) ($25 per month for table games and $10 per month
for each slot machine.)
8 Mark A. Clayton, Esq., Gaming Regulation in Nevada An Update ... , 2 (2006).
9 Lionel, Sawyer, & Collins, supra note 7, at 12.
10 S.B. 142, 1945 Leg., 42nd Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1945).
II Maren Parry, Nevada Gaming Lawyer, September 2007, State Bar of Nevada Gaming Law Section.
12 /d.
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operators from the licensing process or revoke issued licenses. More concerned that unfit
operators would cheat on their taxes than engage in other criminal activity created or
sully gaming's image, the Attorney General penned an opinion in 1947 that became the
basis for the creation of the State Gaming Control Board in 1955. 13 The language granted
the Tax Commission the power to look into an applicant's character when assessing
suitability for any license. 14
As state oversight increased, the epicenter of Nevada gaming shifted south to Las
Vegas. In 1946 the Flamingo Hotel opened and marked the turning point in Clark County's
rise to Nevada's dominate gaming locale. 15 The rise of gaming in southern Nevada brought
Nevada's most infamous casino operators and their connections to organized crime. In
response, the legislature created the Nevada Gaming Control Board in 1955 with the
purpose of removing any undesirable element in gaming and providing regulations for the
licensing and operation of gaming. 16 This marked a turning point in gaming regulation, for
the first time the focus of regulators became tax collection and suitability.
Campaigning against the rise in corruption and criminality in the gaming industry,
Governor Grant Sawyer rode into office determined to clean up Nevada's most important
industry. The first bill he signed was the Gaming Control Act in 1959. 17 The Act created
the new and independent Nevada Gaming Commission whose mandate provided the
impetuous for today's licensing policy and process. 18
Obtaining a gaming license today is a daunting and expensive endeavor that
ultimately comes down to character. 19 The process takes months and costs tens of
thousands of dollars. 20 A prospective licensee must authorize authorities to obtain any
information they may request by waiving any constitutional, statutory, and common law
privilegesY No stone is left unturned; information attorneys, physicians, or any other
person possesses is deemed relevant and examined by investigators. 22 Responsibility of
licensing decisions is vested exclusive with the Gaming Commission and final decisions
are not subject to judicial review. 23 This plenary power is protected from rights afforded
by the U.S. constitution because gaming is reserved to Nevada within the meaning of
the Tenth Amendment. 24 Needless to say, today's gaming licensees are of the highest
moral and ethical character because policy shifted from mere suitability to a standard of
exceptionalism amongst licensees.

Oversight- Compliance Committees and Minimum Internal Controls
Regulations mandating corporate compliance committees have existed since the mid1940's.25 However, Nevada's current regulations requiring a compliance committee and
minimum internal controls developed piecemeal from conditions on select licenses, to an
institutional standard.
In 1984 Carma, a Canadian publicly traded corporation was licensed. Carma was
one of the first companies to have a compliance system in place in Nevada. 26 Nevada
regulatory compliance started to crystallize when Mr. Ginji Yasuda was granted a
limited gaming license to acquire Aladdin Hotel and Casino. One of the conditions was a
compliance committeeY The reasons behind the imposition of a compliance committee
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Op. Att'y Gen. No. 47-528 (1947).
Clayton, supra note 8, at 4.
!d.
Parry, supra note II, at n. 17 citing Lionel, Sawyer, & Collins, Nevada Gaming Law, 23 (3"' ed. 2000); Nev. Rev. Stat.
463.010 (2008) et. seq.
"Exhausted investigations [must] be made as to present licensees in order to be as certain as humanly possible that criminal
elements, mobs, syndicates, have neither interests nor control of existing businesses." !d.
Dean Richard Morgan & Robert Faiss, Do the Right Thing Ethics and the Gaming Industry, Global Gaming Business,
November 2003, at 16.
!d.
!d.
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State v. Rosenthal, 93 Nev. 36, 559, P.2d 830 (1977).
!d.
John K. Maloney, Global Gaming Compliance, 8 Gaming L. Rev. 119, n. I (2004).
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stem from the challenges related to international investigations, such as different cultural
customs, conflicting legal, tax, and accounting systems, and language barriers. 28
In 1991 Nevada Gaming Commission adopted a regulation requiring a compliance
review and reporting system. While compliance committees were becoming
commonplace, this regulation formalized the requirement for licensees. 29 A compliance
committee meets regularly to ensure that the licensee is avoiding undesirable
associations, identify areas of focus that may concern the operator's license, and provide
additional oversight of compliance with laws and regulations. 30 Typically a committee
will discuss sales and leases, material transactions, and transactions with suppliers for
goods and services to formulate an opinion on each actionY When complete the findings
of the committee are transmitted to gaming control agencies. 32
The second component of oversight is the implementation of a comprehensive
system of operational controls known as Minimum Internal Controls or "MICS".
MICS focus on gaming activity and provide rigid guidance for the conduct of games,
the handling of cash and movement of cash, chips, or other financial instruments, and
accounting or document trail for all transactions. 33 MICS help regulators monitor the
daily operations of operators by creating a rough uniformity, any deviation from them
raises the specter of collusion or cheating. 34 Nevada has roughly fifteen hundred MICS
that, in some cases mechanically, govern nearly all aspects of a licensee's business.
The policy oftoday's compliance scheme is the product of a pragmatic approach to
international investigation that eventually recognized the regulatory utility of day-to-day
oversight by regulators. 35
Global Success
Whatever the policy motivations, Nevada gaming regulation has been wildly
successful. Since the elimination of organized crime from the Strip in the early
1980's, gaming grew from a provincially tolerated industry into a global economic
force. 36 Corporate America seems to exchange one scandal for another but gaming
corporations, due to the licensing process and strict oversight, avoid misconduct. 37 In
fact commentators suggest studying Nevada's successful balance of strict regulation and
free market principals in the gaming industry. 38 Strictly regulated gaming is now seen
as a cure-all for cash-strapped governments and, despite a recent downturn, a profitable
investment. Given the success, are the assumptions behind current gaming policy still
valid or has the industry matured to point where new realities must be incorporated to
Nevada's regulatory approach?

III. External Regulators and Market Forces
Since the emergence of mega-resorts, corporate gaming has held center stage in Nevada.
With corporate gaming came new types of business models. Licenses have been granted
to a variety of foreign and domestic business entities from sole proprietorships to publicly
traded corporations, and sovereign wealth funds. 39 These business models were necessary
new types of investment vehicles to create the necessary capital or leverage to finance
28 /d. at 121.
29 See NGC Reg. 5.045(4) "The compliance review and reporting system shall be created for the purpose of monitoring activities
relating to the licensee's or registrant's continuing qualifications under the provisions of the Nevada Gaming Control Act and
regulations of the conunission in accordance with a written plan to be approved by the board administratively or as otherwise
ordered by the conunission"; Maloney, supra note 25, at 121.
30 !d. at 122.
31 /d.
32 Morgan & Faiss, supra note 19, at 18.
33 Aronovitz, supra note 6, at 194.
34 !d.
35 Maloney, supra note 25, at 121.
36 Bo J. Bernhard Ph.D, The Battered Gaming Industry: A Case Study for Our Times?, 13 UNLV Gaming Res. & Rev. J. 55,
57 (2009).
37 Morgan & Faiss, supra note 19.
38 Bernhard, supra note 36, at 57.
39 For a complete list of current nonrestricted, restricted, manufacturer, distributor and slot route operator licenses visit http://
gaming.nv.gov./publications.htrn.
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a non-restricted license. As corporate gaming expanded it brought regulation by other
jurisdictions, federal oversight, shareholder actions, and stakeholder pressure to bear on
Nevada licensees.
Whether strict regulation of suitability, profit margins, or a combination of each
cleared the way for corporate gaming's rise is unresolved. 40 What is clear is that it takes
enormous amounts of capital to obtain a non-restricted license. Beyond the reserves
necessary, the Commission cannot grant a non-restricted license in a county with a
population of 100,000 unless the establishment is a resort hotel. 41 Very few corporate
entities can muster the capital necessary for such an undertaking, one is the publicly
traded corporation. 42 Publicly traded corporations are, at least in theory, owned by their
stockholders who retain private rights of action if harmful business practices, now
forbidden by regulation, result in losses.
Manufacturers and others who operate in multiple jurisdictions, domestic and
foreign, expend enormous amounts of money and manpower to comply with the myriad
oflaws and regulations in eachjurisdiction. 43 Moreover, a knowing violation of another
jurisdiction's laws, regulation or rule and failure to adhere to Nevada standards of
integrity and honesty are all cause for discipline in Nevada. 44
Gaming corporations are subject to many federal regulators in addition to the NGC. 45
Federal regulators create rules that may or may not have the same intent as the Nevada
Gaming Commission but nevertheless require similar reporting. 46
This overlap of regulation creates duplication and increases compliance costs. For
example, prior to the repeal of Regulation 6A, casinos operated under an exemption of
the Bank Secrecy Act. 47 To combat money laundering federal regulation governs cash
transactions, along with suspicious activity report, in financial institutions including
casinos. This exemption required Nevada to constantly amend its regulation to comply
with Federallaw. 48 The benefits began to erode and it was clear that Nevada was spending
state funds to enforce federallaw. 49
Standing alone, gaming is an unmatched source of economic vitality for Nevada.
It created a micro-economy geared towards servicing gaming, directly and indirectly
employing thousands. Because of this and its potential negative effects gaming has also
spawned various interests groups. 5° These relatively powerful stakeholders mitigate the
harmful effects of gaming by exerting pressure on gaming to be a good citizen.
Today's licensees are subject to oversight from a variety of sectors that perform
functions similar, if not identical, as the NGC regulations. Nevada is expending precious
resources to enforce these regulations. Whether continued state oversight is needed in all
areas, or amendments to existing regulations could ease the burden on licensees needs
to be determined. It may save Nevada scarce funds and manpower while increasing the
profitability of gaming.
The assumptions behind a finding of suitability and the regulations it spawned
were for a different set of operators. Today's licensees are held to strict standard by
other jurisdictions, regulators, and stakeholders. Licensees have been de-incentivized
40 Bernhard, supra note 36, at 57.
41 Nev. Rev Stat. §463. 1605 (2008); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. 463.01865 (2008), a resort hotel is "any building or group
of buildings that is maintained as and held out to the public to be a hotel where sleeping accommodations are furnished
to the transient public and that has: More than 200 rooms available for sleeping accommodations; At least one bar with
permanent seating capacity for more than 30 patrons that serves alcoholic beverages sold by the drink for consumption on
the premises; At least one restaurant with permanent seating capacity for more than 60 patrons that is open to the public
24 hours each day and 7 days each week; and a gaming area within the building or group of buildings." Clark County's
definition is narrower.
42 See E.g., MGM, Las Vegas Sands Corp., and Wynn Resorts Limited.
43 Maloney, supra note 25, at 126. The cost may run into the millions of dollars.
44 Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 463.720 (2008).
45 E.g, SEC, Treasury Department- Financial Crimes Enforcement, Committee on Foreign Investment, and Internal Revenue
Service.
46 Compare NGC Reg. 6A (repealed 2007) and Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1953 (2001).
47 NGCReg. 6A repealed 200X; Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C § 1953 (2001).
48 Edward Magaw, Suspicious Activity Reporting and Casinos: The Life and Death of Nevada's Regulation of Casino
Suspicious Activity Reporting, 7 Gaming L. Rev. 427, 443 (2003)._
49 !d.
50 Labor unions. service industry organizations, and problem gambling activists are some of the many groups.
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by the costs, both monetary and personally, of licensure and oversight. So too, the free
market discourages bad-actors and encourages behavior required by the current scheme.
Moreover, the scheme employed by Nevada has created principals the general public
expects from gaming. The legitimacy gaming has earned is a product of the current
system, now that gaming is legitimate is it time to revisit the regulatory scheme and its
policies to update it for today's realities and the future?

IV. Proactive Regulation
Why Evaluate?
Public policy is the implementation of behavior-modifying techniques to affect
individuals, groups, and organizations. 5 1 Policy makers are charged with making
thoughtful rational and well informed decisions. 52 The Fiftieth anniversary of the Gaming
Control Act is an opportunity to validate or eliminate regulation to keep Nevada the
preeminent jurisdiction in global gaming. The current set of regulations and policies
underlying them are the product of measures taken after the manifestation of a need.
An ad hoc approach to regulation of a fast paced and increasingly global industry dulls
Nevada's edge. A proactive approach is needed.
Tough-minded regulations are not meritorious merely because they are toughminded, a thoughtful examination of the reasons behind every MIC or licensing procedure
should be fleshed out by experts. A proactive approach to policy should regulate the
industry as it will be, as opposed to employing a set of possibly stagnant ideas. This
enables Nevada's regulators to foster the essential economic prosperity gaming creates
and provide for the general welfare of the public. 53 Fully vetted regulations will remain as
is, be amended, or discarded. Whether original policy considerations for a regulation are
relevant or are replaced by new, just reasons, the exercise of examination creates buyin from citizens, the industry, regulators and interest groups. Superfluous or inefficient
regulation may be amended or discarded to meet Nevada's needs as determined by the
Gaming Policy Committee and adopted by the Commission.
Who should evaluate?
A model for evaluating gaming policy already exists. Created by the legislature in
1961 the Gaming Policy Committee meets rarely, if ever. 54 The Policy Committee consists
of: one member of the Commission, designated by the Chairman of the Commission;
one member of the Board, designated by the Chairman of the Board; one member of
the Senate appointed by the Legislative Commission; one member of the Assembly
appointed by the Legislative Commission; one enrolled member of a Nevada Indian tribe
appointed by the Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada, Inc.; and five members appointed by
the Governor for terms of 2 years as follows: two representatives of the general public;
two representatives of nonrestricted gaming licensees; and one representative of restricted
gaming licensees. 55 Because the Policy Committee lays dormant, the potential rewards of
this type of group are unrealized.
This model attempts to capture the wide range of interests invested in Nevada's
gaming industry and serves to give a voice to many of those interests. Bringing
together this group will go a long way towards getting experts in the representative
areas discussing current trends in global gaming and Nevada's role as the preeminent
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, it may not bring enough diversity for broad-based input.
As noted earlier interest groups and other stakeholders are invested in gaming's future
and would certainly advocate for a voice in any policy considerations. 56 Given that there
51 Bret Meich, The Power to Destroy: The Psychology of Gaming Taxation, 12 Gaming L. Rev. & Econ. 458,464 (2008)
citing Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 59 J. Bus. 379, 379-80 (Oct. 1986).
52 !d.
53 Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 463.0129 (2008).
54 Nev.Rev.Stat. § 463.021(2008).
55 !d.
56 Pablo T. Spiller & Sanoy Liao, Buy Lobby, or Sue: Interest Groups Participation in Policy Making-A Survey 3 (Nat'!
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12209, April 2006).
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are only two places on the Policy board for members of the general public, and interests
groups would have difficulty qualifying for this designation, a natural competition for
these spots emerges.
The potential for groups left out of the process to scuttle or obstruct the process by
pursuing separate unilateral agendas could undermine recommendations of the Policy
committee. "Large distributional effects of legislation provide the affected groups strong
incentives to attempt to control what policies are made and how they are enforced.
Thus, much of interest group action in the modern administrative state is geared toward
influencing the implementation of, often vague, policies."57 To effectively influence
policy, groups directly or indirectly, lobby, buy, or sue depending on a multitude of
factors. 58 Soliciting the input of interest groups may avoid unintended consequences
created by advocates lobbying outside the Policy committee structure.
Nevada Gaming Regulation 2.100 grants the NGC Chairman the power to appoint
committees to study and report on any topic related to gaming. 59 Utilizing regulation
2.1000 could provide an avenue to expand participation in the formulation of gaming
policy. Similarly, it allows independent and disinterested analysis for any number of
topics concerning gaming. Independent studies could provide an important check on the
Policy Committee and interest groups as well as a provide substantiation or rejection of
assumptions.
Areas for inquiry
Potential areas to study are numerous. However, the rapid expansion of gaming
and the recent economic downturn may be harbingers that previous regulations and the
policies behind them need adjustment. Multi-jurisdiction licensure and compliance are
costly and manpower intensive. 60 The pressing need for new sources of capital forced
licensees to seek out new investment. 61 However, regulations require mandatory licensure
for certain levels of investment dissuade some investors or prolong the time frame.
Addressing licensure does not mean lowering Nevada's standards. Rather using Nevada's
cache as the preeminent investigatory jurisdiction to engage other jurisdictions, both
foreign and domestic, to create processes that reduce licensee's global burdens, benefits
Nevada. Licensure forms typically ask similar questions in various ways but the intent
behind each is the same; harmonizing these procedures would go along way in reducing
costs.
Revisiting the amount of investment that triggers automatic licensure requirement
likewise should be examined. The policy behind this seems straight forward, by licensing
beneficial owners gaming remains free of undesirable elements. However, institutional
investors and investment vehicles not considered or known in the past, which fall in
to this category, yet as a business model are passive investors, may refuse to undergo
the licensing process and invest their dollars elsewhere. Policy considerations that
determined the percentages listed in the regulation need to be justified in these times and
for the future so gaming can keep pace with financial markets.

V. Conclusion
Nevada Gaming is at a turning point, gaming revenues are down and the industry
is weathering a difficult economic storm. Gaming has been through worse and come
out ahead no doubt gaming will emerge stronger for the experience. 62 The policies,
assumptions, and regulations that brought us to this point have been incredibly
57 /d. at 5.
58 ld. at 5-6.
59 NGC Reg. 2.100 (1990). The chairman may at his discretion appoint committees to study and report to the board or the
commission any matter appropriate to the commission's administration of the Gaming Control Act or these regulations.
60 Maloney, supra note 43.
61 MGM sought help to finance City Center from Infinity World, a subsidiary of Dubai World, creating a joint venture in the
project. Las Vegas Sands Corp .• offered eighteen million shares of common stock and five million of Series A stock in
November.
62 Gabrielle Angle, We're Not Dead Yet: The Darwinian Nature of Nevada s Gaming Industry, (forthcoming May 2009).
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successful. If they are to carry Nevada for the next fifty years an examination to validate,
amend, or dispose of the regulations and the policies behind them is necessary to keep
Nevada on the leading edge of global gaming.
e to acquire funding. 63

63 NGC Reg. 16.430(1) (2002) allows an investor to apply for a waiver of Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 463.643 if the investment is less
fifteen percent and in some cases nineteen percent.
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